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ABSTRACT
Managers/owners of short-line railroads were queried about three issues: (1) How would you
describe your company’s business relationship with the Class I railroad(s) with which you
interchange traffic; (2) Do you believe that mergers between Class I railroads have been good
or bad for short-line railroads; and (3) Besides merger activity, what do you believe will be the
most important trend for Class I railroads in the next 10 years?

INTRODUCTION
Short-line railroads (defined herein as railroads
with less than 250 miles of trackage) have been
part of the transportation industry for many
decades. Before 1970 their numbers had been in
a long term decline. For example, in 1916 there
were approximately 1,000 of these carriers, but
by 1970 the number had shrunk to about 240
companies (Levine et al., 1982). The federal
regulatory environment became more friendly

toward the formation of new short-line railroads
starting in the early 1970s. This was precipi
tated by the bankruptcy of the Milwaukee Road
and the Rock Island railroads. Because portions
of these railroads could be operated profitably,
the federal government enacted laws to facilitate
the operation of the viable segments of the failed
carriers. Specific legislation included: (a.) The 3R Act of 1973, (b.) The 4-R Act of 1976, and (c.)
The Local Rail Service Assistance Act of 1978
(Babcock et al., 1995).
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Further encouragement of the short-line rail
sector took place in 1980 by the enactment of the
Staggers Rail Act. This law facilitated the
formation of new short-lines by procedures that
liberalized the abandonment of light traffic
density trackage by the larger Class I railroads.
(Class I railroads are defined by the Surface
Transportation Board in terms of their annual
revenues, adjusted yearly for inflation.
Currently, Class I railroads have approximately
$260 million or more in revenues.) Much of the
abandoned trackage became the new short-line
railroads (Due 1984). Between 1980 and 1989,
approximately 230 new short-lines began
operation (Babcock et al., 1995).

Class I carriers will also continue to rationalize
their route system (Kruglinski 2001). Class I
railroads prefer to sell this trackage, because
short-lines generate additional business that
would have been lost if the trackage was
abandoned (Due 1984; Landry and Ozment
2001a). Finally, short-line railroads are also
involved in mergers. RailAmerica operates
approximately 40 short-lines in North American
and continues to add properties to its corporate
structure. In late 2001 it purchased StatesRail,
a privately owned company that operates eight
short-line railroads (Gallagher 2001a; Rock
2002).
Operating Characteristics

The purpose of this study is to learn more about
what managers of short-line railroads think
about Class I railroads. To accomplish this
objective, we surveyed about 450 owners/
managers of short-line railroads. Specifically,
this article will address the following topics: (a.)
A brief literature review, (b.) A description of the
research methodology utilized, (c.) An exami
nation of the respondents’ answers to this
question, “Overall, how would you describe your
company’s business relationship with the Class
I railroads with which you interchange traffic?”
(d.) A look at how the short-line owner/managers
answered this query, “Do you think the recent
history of mergers between Class I railroads has
been good or bad for short-line rail companies?”
and (e.) An analysis of how the respondents
replied to this question, “Besides merger activity,
what do you believe will be the most important
trend for Class I railroads in the next ten years?”

BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW
Short-line railroads are typically established
when a Class I railroad spins-off their low traffic
density trackage. For example, when the
Burlington Northern and the Santa Fe railroads
merged in 1995, the combined carrier sold about
2,000 miles of trackage to short-line railroads
(Fairbank 1999). In 2000 the BNSF indicated
that additional lighter density trackage will be
spun-off to short-lines (Blanchard 2001c). Other
rail industry observers believe that additional
28
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There are approximately 450 short-line railroads
in the United States today (Pocket 2000). They
operate in an analogous manner to commuter
airlines that feed passengers between smaller
cities and major city airports. Short-line rail
roads collect freight from shippers on light
density trackage and transport it to the Class I
main-line intercity trackage for delivery to the
consignee, and vice versa. Rail industry
management consultant, Roy Blanchard, noted,
The short-line thus is the bridge between
the batch process of the Class I and the
custom-made process of the small
railroad (Blanchard 2001b).
Most, but not all (Turner 2001), short-line
employees are non-union. While this typically
results in lower wage rates, a more important
advantage to management is the less restrictive
work-rules compared to a unionized labor force.
Thus, the locomotive engineer may operate the
train in the morning, do track maintenance work
in the early afternoon, and make sales calls in
the late afternoon (Babcock 1995; Due 1984; Due
and Leever 1997; Probing 1995).
Problems
A recent survey of short-line railroad managers
by Professors Landry and Ozment found that the
most serious threat, as perceived by these

managers, involved their relationships with
Class I railroads (Landry and Ozment 2001b).
Here is a summary of the main problems
involving Class I railroads: (a.) Short-lines
receive an inadequate percentage of the total
revenues when interlining with Class I carriers
(Due and Leever 1997), (b.) After initially
purchasing the trackage from the selling Class I
carrier, it is so run-down from years of deferred
maintenance, that the short-line cannot afford to
bring it back to acceptable operating standards
(Carroll 2001), (c.) A “paper barrier” is often
imposed by the selling Class l carrier that
mandates that the short-line must interline
exclusively with them, even if other short-lines
or Class I’s have trackage that connects to the
short-line railroad (Wilner 2000c; Wilner 2001a;
Wilner 2000a), (d.) The Class I’s will not
adequately supply the short-line with rail cars
during times of seasonal shortages (Due and
Leever 1997; Gallagher 1999; Landry and
Ozment 2001b; Kaufman 2000a), (e.) Class I
railroads try to convince shippers to locate new
facilities directly on the Class Fs trackage, so the
Class I does not have to share the rail revenue
with the short-line (Burke 1997), (f.) Class I
carriers desire to exclusively transport rail cars
that accommodate 286,000 gross weight tons,
and many short-lines do not have trackage or
bridges that can safely handle this weight
(Burke 1997; Gallagher 2000; Saylor 1999;
Wilner 1999; Zarembski and Turner 2001), and
(g.) Class I service standards are often so bad
that shippers become frustrated and switch their
business to the trucking industry (Duff 2000a;
Gallagher 2000; Judge 2000; Kaufman 2000b;
Vantuono 2001a).
Three additional problems that do not involve
Class I railroads are: (a.) Short-lines are
devastated when floods or storms wash-out
bridges, tunnels and trackage, because they
typically do not have the ability to re-route their
trains around the problem (Due 1984), (b.)
There may not be enough business located on
their trackage to generate adequate revenues to
stay in business, especially if many of the
shippers are in the same business which then
experiences an economic downturn in their

industry (Due and Leever 1997; Glischinski
2000; Prater and Babcock 1998; Wilner 2001b),
and (c.) Federal Railroad Administration safety
regulations often place unreasonable burdens on
small railroads (Landry and Ozment 2001a;
Landry and Ozment 2001b).
Service Successes
The recent survey of short-line managers by
Professors Landry and Ozment also asked
respondents what was their greatest competitive
advantage over the Class I railroads. By far the
most common answer was their ability to provide
shippers with customized service (Landry and
Ozment 2001b). Service excellence increases
sales. Burlington Northern Santa Fe CEO Matt
Rose noted that in recent years, short-line
railroad revenues have been growing at an
annual rate of 7%, while Class Fs sales are
advancing only 2.5% annually (Blanchard 2001c;
Gallagher 2001c). BNSF Vice-President Peter
Rickershauser commented that,
Short-lines bring us business that we
couldn’t otherwise get, with a creativity
that, quite frankly, is hard to match
(Vantuono 2001a).
The BNSF obviously appreciates the service
excellence of short-lines. Dave Garin, a BNSF
manager, speaking at a rail industry conference
about short-line railroad strengths, observed,
“It’s all about service, service, service, and you
can do it best,” (Blanchard 2001a).
An example of this customer friendly service is
provided by the Indiana Rail Road. Its employees
stress improved service reliability. They daily
transport GE refrigerators with a dedicated 25
car train that runs from the GE factory at
Bloomington, Indiana, to CSXT, a Class I
railroad, at Indianapolis. Tom Hoback, CEO and
President of Indiana Rail Road, said
I’ve always believed that if you could run
a railroad like a business and not like a
railroad, you could do well. We took a
railroad that was going to be abandoned
Fall 2002
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in the 1970s and increased traffic more
than five-fold (Blanchard 2001c).

Class I Mergers
The railroad industry’s “Golden Era” came to an
end in 1916. Prior to this, railroads had a near
monopoly on domestic intercity transportation.
The only serious competitor was barge trans
portation on a few waterways and coastal, or
intercoastal, shipping. Total railroad track
mileage in 1916 was 254,000 miles, and it
declined every year thereafter. The primary
reason was the growth of the trucking industry
(Stover 1961). Concomitant with the declining
trackage came a decrease in the number of
intercity railroads. In 1898 there were 836 Class
I railroads (Thirteenth 1900), and by 1936 this
number had decreased to 139 (Locklin 1938).
What follows are the number of Class I railroads
for selected years: 1970—71; 1980—42;
1990—16; 1994—13; and early 2002—7 (Annual;
Association 2002). Prior to the 1980s, many rail
mergers were “side-by-side,” meaning that the
two railroads in many cases served the same
geographic area. After the merger, the duplicate
trackage was often sold to short-line railroads.
More recently the predominant form of rail
merger has been the “end-to-end” type,
indicating that each railroad prior to the merger
served a different geographic area. These types
of mergers involved less reduction of trackage
(Burns 1998; Johnson and Whiteside 1975;
Saunders 2001; Wilner 1997).
With only four major rail systems in the
U.S.—Burlington Northern Santa Fe, CSX,
Norfolk Southern, and Union Pacific—some
shippers believe that rail management has
become arrogant. Edward M. Emmett, president
of the National Industrial Transportation
League, (a large shippers’ organization) noted,
Major rail customers continue to be
frustrated not only by inconsistent
service, but also. by a[n] “imperial”
attitude on the part of some railroads
(Gottlieb 2001).
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This situation, along with the service
breakdowns that have occurred with recent rail
mergers (some shippers refer to this as “track
trauma” (North 2000; O’Reilly 1998)), led the
Surface Transportation Board to declare a fifteen
month moratorium on all Class I rail mergers
that ended in June 2001. This action was taken
after the Burlington Northern Santa Fe and
Canadian National applied to the STB for
permission to merge. These carriers have since
withdrawn their merger application (Why 2000;
Shoot-out 2000; Wilner 2000b).
The newly revised STB rail merger guidelines
became effective in June 2001 (Rail 2001). They
were designed to not just preserve rail
competition, but to enhance it. Future rail
merger applications must contain a “Service
Assurance Plan,” which details exactly how and
why the combined carrier will be able to render
improved service to their shippers. In addition,
applications that contain “competitive enhance
ments” will be more favorably considered. These
include trackage rights, reciprocal switching
agreements, and improved efforts to work with
short-line railroads (New 2001).

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To address the aforementioned objectives, a
survey of owners and managers of short-line rail
companies was designed. The mailing list was
compiled from Primedia Directories’ The Pocket
List of Railroad Officials. For purposes of this
study, a short-line railroad was operationally
defined as any railroad identified in the Pocket
List that operates a system that includes a
maximum of 250 miles of trackage. This
definition is consistent with but not identical to
the Surface Transportation Board (STB) “Class
III railroad” designation (any railroad with an
annual operating revenue of less than $20.5
million) and/or to the Association of American
Railroads (AAR) “local railroad” designation (any
railroad with an annual operating revenue below
$40 million and less than 350 miles of track
operated).

The actual mailing list was compiled as follows.
There are a total of 725 railroad companies
identified in the Pocket List. Of these, 125 were
deleted for one or another of the following
reasons:
• Company was identified as STB Class I or Class
II railroad
• Company was identified as an AAR regional as
opposed to local railroad
• Company was
United States

headquartered outside

the

• No mailing address was included with the
directory listing
Of the remaining 600 railroad companies, another
149 were deleted because of duplicated man
agement or cross-over ownership so that any
given individual would be asked to participate no
more than once. The final mailing list consisted of
451 unique owners/managers. Each of these per
sons was mailed a copy of the questionnaire
approximately one week following receipt of a
postcard announcing the survey and requesting
participation. In addition, each was sent a “thankyou” letter and follow-up copy of the question
naire approximately ten days later, for a total of
three separate mailed contacts. During this
period, nine questionnaires were returned for bad
addresses, reflecting a very high overall rate of
accuracy in the Pocket Directory.
Of the 442 delivered questionnaires, responses
were eventually received from a total of 114,
representing a response rate of 26%. This level of
participation is considered very adequate, espe
cially given the professional nature and harried
work lives of the sampled population of railroad
owners and managers. Of these 114 usable re
sponses, an additional seventeen were deleted
because they represented companies that
exceeded the 250 mile trackage limit set in the
operational definition of a short-line railroad
guiding this study. The remaining 97 companies
comprise the data base of short-line rail com
panies on which the results reported herein are
based.

PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS
AND RESPONDING COMPANIES
As measured by number of employees, the
responding companies were quite small. The
sample was divided almost evenly between
companies with fewer than ten employees
(49.5%) and those with ten or more employees
(50.5%). One-fourth of the responding companies
had fewer than five employees, and three-fourths
of them had fewer than twenty-five employees.
Company size was also measure by annual
revenue, but those results are not presented here
for two reasons. First, sixteen of the 97 qualified
respondents (16.5%) chose not to disclose their
annual revenue. Second, there is a significant
and fairly strong correlation (+.504, p < .001)
between revenue and number of employees.
A different dimension of a short-line railroad’s
size is captured by the total miles of trackage it
operates, that being an indication of the line’s
geographical coverage. About two-fifths (39.2%)
of the short-line companies in the study operate
with more than 50 miles of track (up to the
qualifying limit of 250 miles), and three-fifths
(60.8%) operate with fewer than 50 miles of
track. Again, forty percent of the companies have
fewer than 25 miles of track and fifteen percent
have fewer than ten miles of track.
Just over one-third (36.1%) of the companies
included in the study were formed before the
1980 Stagger’s Act that substantially
deregulated the U.S. rail industry. Another onefourth (26.8%) were formed during the industry’s
tumultuous decade of the 1980s, and the
remainder were started between 1990 and 2000.
Respondents were also queried about their own
age and education. They are very highly
educated. Nearly forty percent (39.2%) have
earned a 4-year degree, and another one-fourth
(24.7%) have received a graduate degree. Thus,
only about one-third of all respondents (36.0%)
do not have a college degree (but sixty percent of
that group have some college education). Finally,
almost six out of every ten (57.3%) are at least
Fifty years old.
Fall 2002
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RELATIONSHIP WITH CLASS I
INTERCHANGE RAILROADS
It is absolutely essential to the financial health
of a short-line that it maintain a good working
relationship with the Class I railroads to whom
it bridges traffic. Without their Class I “part
ners,” short-lines would have no way of
connecting, literally or figuratively, with most of
the rest of the world. Correspondingly, short-line
owners and managers in the study were asked:
Overall, how would you describe your
company’s business relationship with the
Class I railroads with which you interchange
traffic?
____

Very Good

Good

employees were significantly more likely to say
they have a good or very good relationship with
their Class I interchange lines (73.5%) when
compared to those from companies with fewer
than ten employees (56.5%). Also, while not
statistically significant, there was also a
tendency for managers of older companies—
formed prior to 1980—to more often say they
have a good or very good relationship with their
interchange railroads (76.5%) and for managers
with a four year degree to say so (76.3%).
Collectively, these were the only three subgroups
in which more than seventy percent of managers
felt their relationship to the relevant Class I
roads was good or very good.
CLASS I RAILROAD MERGERS’
IMPACT ON SHORT-LINES

____ Neither Good nor Bad _____ Bad
____

Very Bad

Figure 1 contains the basic results pertaining to
this question. Only a very few respondents
characterized their relationship with Class I
railroads as being negative. Just three of the
ninety-seven participants said that the
relationship was bad, and no one said that it was
very bad. Conversely, half of the respondents
(50.0%) said that their relationship with
interchanging Class I rail lines was good, and
another fifteen percent (14.7%) said that it was
very good. In total, 64.7% of all respondents said
that they have a good or very good relationship
with their Class I “partners.” The remaining onethird of respondents (31.6%) characterized the
relationship as neither good nor bad.

Since passage of the Staggers Act in 1980, there
has been considerable merger activity involving
the nation’s Class I railroads. How has this
frenetic situation been received by the
owner/managers of short-line railroads? To
investigate this issue, each respondent was
asked:
Do you think the recent history of mergers
between Class 1 railroads has been good or
bad for short-line railcompanies?
____ Very Good

_____ Good

____ Neither Good nor Bad_____Bad
____ Very Bad

Please tell us why you responded as you did:
Figure 2 can be used to compare the percent of
respondents who said they have a good or very
good relationship with their Class I interchange
companies across various subgroups of the
sample based on characteristics of the res
pondent or his/her company.
The difference involving number of employees
was statistically significant at the ten percent
level (chi-square = 3.01; p < .10). Specifically,
managers of companies with ten or more
32
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Figure 3 presents the percentage responses to
this question. Clearly, more respondents think
the merger activity has been bad for short-lines
than think the reverse. In particular, 37.6% of
respondents think that the merger activity has
been bad for their sector, and another 18.3%

FIGURE 1
SHORT LINE’S BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP WITH CLASS I INTERCHANGE RAILROADS
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40 0%
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60 0%
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FIGURE 2
PERCENT INDICATING BUSINESS RELATIONS WITH CLASS I
INTERCHANGE RAILROADS IS GOOD/VERY GOOD BY CLASSIFICATION DATA
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FIGURE 3
CLASS I RAILROAD MERGERS’ IMPACT ON SHORT LINES

TABLE 1
CLASS I MERGERS: CROSS-TABULATION ANALYSIS

Class I
Railroad
Mergers’
Impact on
Short Lines:

Respondent Age

Year Company Formed

Respondent Education

Total
Trackage

Number of
Employees
Total

< 50
Years
<%)

50 +
Years
(%)

No
degree
(%)

4 Year
Degree
<%)

Grad.
Degree
<%)

Before
1980
<%)

1980
to
1989
<%>

1990
to
2000
(%)

< 50
miles
<%)

50 +
miles
<%)

< 10
(%)

10 +
(%)

Good/Very Good

20.5

20.8

28.1

26.3

4.3

27.3

19.2

17.6

17.9

27.0

17.8

25.0

21.5

Neither

20.5

24.5

21.9

23.7

21.7

21.2

19.2

26.5

28.6

13.5

22.2

22.9

22.6

Bad/Very Bad

59.0

54.7

50.0

50.0

73.9

51.5

61.5

55.9

53.6

59.5

60.0

52.1

55.9

Total

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.00

Base

(39)

(53)

(33)

(26)

(34)

(56)

(37)

(45)

(48)

(93)

(32)

(38)

(23)

think it has been very bad. Altogether, more
than half of the respondents (55.9%) think that
the Class I mergers have affected short-lines
negatively, as compared to just one in five
(21.5%) who think this activity has been good or
very good for short-lines. (Note: The remaining
22.6% of respondents said the mergers have been
neither good nor bad for their industry.) Overall,
the short-line railroad industry has not reacted
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well to the recent mergers involving their larger
cousins.
Table 1 presents a set of descriptive comparisons
of responses to this question across various
subgroups of the sample. Generally, the
contention that the recent merger history
involving Class I roads has been bad or very bad
for short line rail companies (representing 55.9%

of all respondents) was stronger than average
among respondents who:
• Possess a graduate degree (73.9%) and/or are
less than fifty years old (59.0%).
• Represent a company formed in the decade
following deregulation (61.5%).
• Work for a short-line with fewer than ten
employees (60.0%) or at least fifty miles of
track (59.5%).
Please keep in mind, however, that the overall
differences between subgroups in a given classifi
cation variable were modest; indeed, none was
statistically significant at the ten percent level or
less based on appropriate chi-square contingency
table tests.

IMPACT OF CLASS I MERGERS ON
SHORT-LINES: DETRIMENTAL
ASPECTS
Respondents were also asked to explain why
they felt as they did about the impact of Class I
mergers. Of the 54 owner/managers who thought
that Class I merger activity was either “bad” or
“very bad,” we were able to categorize their
responses into four general themes. Because
some respondents mentioned more than one
reason for their position, there were 84
rationales enumerated. Each of these general
themes will be examined in the descending order
of frequency that they were stated. In addition,
six reasons (7.1% of the total number of
explanations) were mentioned only once or twice,
and they are not included in the discussion.

competition often eliminated, there was no
longer any reason to be concerned about the
short-line’s business, because as a monopolist, it
was obtained by default. This explanation was
stated by 25 respondents, representing 29.8% of
the total number of reasons enumerated. Below
are five typical respondent comments. Each of
these statements is either a direct quotation or
an amalgamation of the comments of two or
more respondents.
• Without competition service gets worse, prices
rise, and nobody cares any more.
• Concentrated power produces less competition
from the connecting Class I railroads.
• Class I mergers have created giants that are
extremely difficult to communicate with
because of their arrogance. Actually you do not
work with them, they “dictate” rates, and are
generally unwilling to negotiate any aspect of
service that you would like to provide to your
customers.
• We used to have two Class I’s that, at least at
times, competed for our business. Now they
have merged and we have been forgotten about
in terms of meeting our needs, and those of our
customers. Class I monopoly power is harmful
to our long-term existence.
• When you have a monopoly, your attitude is
different than when you have competition. This
is exactly what is happening to Class I’s today.
They have a monopoly, and they know we
know it, and they let us know in no uncertain
terms that “it’s our way or else—literally take
it or leave it.”

Less Competition for Short-lines’ Business
The most common explanation why short-line
owner/managers believe Class I merger activity
has not been beneficial to them is that it has
decreased competition for their business.
Specifically, prior to the merger, the short-line
was served by two competing Class I railroads,
both of which desired to obtain more traffic from
the short-line railroad. After the merger, with

Class I Merger-Related Service
Breakdowns
Twenty-three respondents (representing 27.4%
of the total reasons) stated that as a result of
recent Class I unifications, and the resulting
service catastrophes, it has affected their
business in both the short and long-terms. Here
are four of their observations:
Fall 2002
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• Recent mergers, and the service disruptions
that then took place, have focused rail
management on merger integration and cost
cutting, not on developing new business or
improving service. In any case, the result is
that frustrated shippers took their business to
the trucking industry, and some of this traffic
will never return to the rail system.
• First the Class 1’s merged. Then service levels
suffered. The result—we lost business
immediately and some of it has not come back
and I don’t think it will.
• As the Class 1’s try to digest their mega
mergers, service declines. This decline in
service particularly impacts short-lines,
because all we have to sell is service.
• Service has never been as bad as it is now and
nobody at the super-roads seems to pay more
than lip service to these problems. They just
don’t get it.

Class I’s Have Minimal Interest in Single
Car Shipments
Seventeen respondents (20.2% of the total
reasons) stated that mergers have hurt their
business because the newly enlarged Class I
railroads seem to have little interest in single, or
a few car, shipments. Below are three of their
observations.
• Today Class I’s do not want to focus on the
small moves—only on unit-trains, etc. These
small moves are the “lifeblood” of short-line
railroads. Their attitude is killing us and they
don’t seem to care.
• Class I’s apparently do not desire to pick-up a
small number of cars from short-lines. They
just want high volume shipments between
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major cities. Their marketing people do not
understand our shippers’ needs and
furthermore, they don’t want to.
• As the Class I’s become larger, the more their
personalized service to short-lines gets lost in
the shuffle. They do not realize, or if they do
they don’t care, that all we have to sell is
SERVICE!

Class I Bureaucracy Becomes Invidious
The final problem with Class I mergers, as noted
by 13 of our respondents (15.5% of the total
complaints), was that the resulting bureaucracy
of the enlarged railroad made it more difficult to
work with the Class I railroad. Below are three
of their statements:
• The merged railroad becomes even more
distant from us. We become more and more
isolated from them, and they have a harder
and harder time identifying with our situation.
Their bureaucracies are so mammoth that it
becomes very difficult for them to make
decisions in a timely manner. We can make
decisions almost immediately, but what good
does it do us, since we have to interline almost
all of our traffic with them.
• The larger the Class I’s become, the longer it
takes them to respond to our needs and
requests. Then when they finally do respond,
they are less sensitive to our customers needs,
both in terms of customized rates and services.
• Bigger is not better. It sure is slower when it
comes to making decisions!
Table 2 summarizes the reasons why respon
dents believed that Class I rail mergers are
detrimental to short-line railroads.

TABLE 2
DETRIMENTAL ASPECTS OF CLASS I
MERGERS ON SHORT-LINE RAILROADS
Reasons

Percentage

Less Competition for Short-Lines’
Business

29.8

Class I Merger-Related Service
Breakdowns

27.4

Class Is Have Minimal Interest in
Single Car Shipments

20.2

Class I Bureaucracy Becomes Invidious

15.5

Miscellaneous
Total

7.1
100.0

IMPACT OF CLASS I MERGERS ON
SHORT-LINES: POSITIVE BENEFITS
When respondents were asked their opinion
about the Class I merger movement, 21 short
line owner/managers thought it was either “very
good” or “good.” When queried about why they
took this position, we found that they
cumulatively noted 28 reasons. Three statements
were only mentioned once (10.7% of the total
number of explanations) and are not included in
the discussion below. Each of the two major
explanations will be examined below in the
descending order of frequency that they
appeared.

Class I’s Will Only Offer Main-Line Service
Nineteen respondents (representing 67.9% of the
total number of positive explanations) thought
Class I mergers were beneficial for their industry
because of the future direction of Class I
operations. These respondents thought Class I’s
will continue to heavily stress main-line intercity
transportation service. Therefore, in many
situations, the pick-up and delivery service will
have to be provided by the short-lines. The
result is the increasing importance of short-lines

to the rail industry. Below are Five of their
statements.
• Class I’s do not want to be involved directly
with customers. They desire to exclusively
dispatch high volume, high speed intercity
trains. We will become more and more
important as the customer contact personnel
with shippers/consignees. With our knowledge
of each customer’s transportation require
ments, we will provide the “real people”
customer service that all shippers/consignees
desire.
• Larger railroads do not want to be bothered by
a lot of switching at both ends of a shipment,
mainly because their labor costs are pro
hibitively expensive. Nor do they want to be
involved in shipments to smaller cities. Both of
these situations are our “bread and butter.”
This explains why we are in a growth industry.
• As each Class I gets bigger after a merger, they
become less customer acquainted. These mega
railroads do not care about the great majority
of medium and smaller shippers/ receivers.
This is great for us, because what they want
out of us is our strength and passion.
• Switching is the bane of large railroads. It is
our best service. Therefore, I love to see Class
I mergers!
• Before the latest wave of Class I mergers,
these large railroads were still trying to do
their own pick-up and delivery. Therefore, they
often did not want to try to work with me. Now
they approach me and ask me to partner with
them. It is an excellent division of labor. We
are each doing what we do best.

Accelerating Trend To Sell Branch-Line
Trackage
Six short-line owner/managers (representing
21.4% of the total number of reasons enumer
ated) stated that Class I mergers were beneficial
to their industry because it would accelerate
the sale of branch-line trackage to short
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line carriers.
observations.

Below

are

three

of

their

• Class I’s will continue to spin-off low density
trackage, which they are more and more
defining as any trackage that is not part of
their main-line system.
• Class I mergers are expensive. After the
merger, to generate additional dollars to pay of
debt, the combined carrier frequently sells off
low traffic trackage.
• Labor costs are killing Class I railroads. These
railroads can only operate efficiently and
profitably on high volume main-line trackage.
Especially after mergers, when top manage
ment must now “make their numbers” to show
the wisdom of the transaction, is when
additional spin-offs take place.
Table 3 summarizes the reasons why short-line
owner/managers believe Class mergers are
beneficial to their industry.

OTHER IMPORTANT CLASS I TRENDS
Each respondent was also asked,
Besides merger activity, what do you believe
will be the most important trend for Class I
railroads in the next ten years?
We were able to categorize the responses into six
general themes, each of which will be examined
below. When answering this query, the 97
respondents noted 117 reasons for their
responses. There were 16 answers (13.7% of the
total number of reasons enumerated) that were
only mentioned once or twice, and they are not
included in the discussion below. Each of the
explanations will be examined in the descending
order of frequency that they were mentioned.

Increased Utilization of Scheduled Trains
The most common response about future trends
for Class I railroads involved the increased
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TABLE 3
BENEFICIAL ASPECTS OF CLASS I
MERGERS ON SHORT-LINE RAILROADS
Reasons

Percentage

Class I Railroads Will Only Offer
Main-Line Service

67.9

Accelerating Trend to Sell BranchLine Trackage

21.4

Miscellaneous

10.7

Total

100.0

utilization of scheduled trains. This idea was
noted by 36 managers, representing 30.8% of the
total explanations given. This concept involves
trains departing classification yards on set
schedules, regardless of the number of cars that
have been accumulated when the train is
scheduled to leave (Vantuono 2001b; Ytuarte
2001). The effect of this type of train operation is
far more delivery schedule consistency. Below
are four respondent statements:
• Service, service, service—this is what will save
the rail industry. The key to this is scheduled
train operations, and the CN is showing the
world how it can be done.
• Our industry will become almost irrelevant if
service levels do not improve. If they don’t, we
will just get the bulk commodities that we get
by default, such as coal, grain, sand, fertilizers,
ores and bulk chemicals. The key to growth is
consistent and reliable delivery schedules, and
the key to this is scheduled train operations. It
is as simple as that.
• Class I’s must shift their orientation to being a
service oriented business, from one that is
operationally oriented. Scheduled train despat
ching is the obvious answer. At least I hope it
is the obvious answer, because if the Class I’s
don’t change, the industry will slowly die, and
it will take my company down with them.

• Re-engineering their operations to function
more like the trucking industry. That is, run
more trains on set schedules. Shippers will pay
for a reliable and consistent service.

Continued Class I Sale of Light Traffic
Density Trackage
Twenty-seven respondents (23.1% of all
explanations) stated that Class I railroads will
continue to sell their light traffic density
trackage to short-lines. The reason is that Class
I’s will operate with a new paradigm. It will
involve running trains primarily on their main
lines between major cities. Branch line trackage
will be sold to the short-lines, which will then
feed traffic to the Class Fs. In addition, Class Fs
will desire to de-emphasize customer contact
activities, such as pick-up and delivery services,
which will be operated more efficiently by the
short-lines. Here are three respondent obser
vations.
• The new Class I business model will involve
them operating
high speed, frequently
scheduled trains on their intercity main-lines.
Short-lines will become their partners to feed
traffic from shippers on lighter density
trackage.
• Class I carriers will be in the “wholesale”
transportation business. They will operate only
on main-line corridors between major cities.
The “retail” side of the rail business will be
conducted by short-lines. We will be the
customer contact people, who arrange pick-ups
and delivery, and customize service levels for
our shippers using the services of the Class I
railroads.
• Customer relations and marketing in general
is too labor intense for Class Fs. They just
desire to run their trains on the high traffic
density trackage. We will more and more
assume the marketing activities of the Class
Fs. Short-lines are starting to be appreciated
by the Class Fs for the essential services we
provide.

Rail Industry Renaissance
The 21st Century, according to 13 respondents
(11.1% of all reasons), will experience a rail
industry rebirth. The reason is that the highway
system cannot continue to expand to accom
modate additional traffic as the economy grows.
In addition, automobile passengers will continue
to press for governmental policies that shift
truck traffic from the highway system to the
underutilized rail industry. Here are three
comments.
• Rail/truck intermodal shipments will be the
norm for the 21st Century. It will happen
because we as a country cannot afford to even
maintain the existing highway system, let
alone build new highway lanes. As this takes
place, and it has to take place, we as short
lines will prosper along with the Class Fs.
• Traffic must come off of the highways! They
are too crowded now and the situation is
getting worse year by year. Either traffic will
go all rail, or it will be piggyback, but in any
case it will be transported between cities by
rail. This additional traffic will help the rail
industry, and since the Class Fs look to us to
be their marketing departments, our impor
tance can only grow.
• In my judgment, this question is a no-brainer.
The rail industry will become more important
by default. Traffic cannot stay on the
horrendously crowded highway system. The
only place it can go is to the rail system which
already has a substantial amount of
unusedcapacity. I just hope the Class Fs don’t
drop the ball on this issue.

Labor Cost Reduction
Ten short line-line owner/managers (8.5% of the
reasons noted) said the most important Class I
trend for the next decade is their reduction of
labor costs. Here are two of their statements.
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• The rail industry is plagued by high labor
costs. This is because the industry is highly
unionized. Many people do not realize that of
the three major modes of domestic
transportation, truck, rail, and air, the rail
industry has the highest average labor costs
(not counting management). The only way for
the rail industry to survive is to reduce labor
costs. They will do this by outsourcing as many
activities as possible. Short-lines will perform
the origination and delivery function, as well
as most customer service functions. The Class
I’s will exclusively provide just train service
between major cities, and all other activities
will be outsourced to short-lines.
• Class I unionized labor rates must come down.
Management will ask the craft and operating
rail unions to allow cross-functional workrules. Knowing rail unions, they will probably
not agree to this. If this happens, and I’m sure
it will, then Class I management will continue
to outsource all but their main-line operations.
This is why I believe the short-line rail
industry will become more important in the
future.

Governmental Funding of Rail
Infrastructure
Although traditionally the rail industry has
provided their own right-of-way with no
governmental funding, this may change. Some
Class I senior managers have said that this issue
is too important, and the capital requirements
are so great, that it needs to be studied with an
open mind (Gallagher 2001b). Eight respondents
(6.8% of the total reasons) said that in their
judgment governmental funding of the rail
infrastructure will become the norm. Here is one
comment.
• Class I railroads are not maintaining their
rights-of-way adequately. Just recently the
BNSF stated that they are cutting back on
their right-of-way maintenance, because the
railroad is not earning its cost of capital.
Therefore, if we as a country are going to shift
traffic from the highways to the rails, we must
40
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have a rail system that can accommodate this
additional traffic. That is why both the federal
and state governments are going to have to get
involved in funding the rail infrastructure. And
Class I management had better swallow their
pride and accept this financial help, just the
way the truckers and airlines have for decades.

Federal Rail Re-Regulation
Seven respondents (representing 6.0% of all
reasons) thought that the rail industry would be
re-regulated by the federal government because
of the monopoly situation existing for many
shippers today (Duff 2000b; Kertes 1998;
Kruglinski 2001). This situation exists because
there have been so many mergers that most
shippers today are served by only one Class I
carrier. Here is one observation.
• Class I's continue to alienate more shippers
and community elected officials. This arro
gance comes from being the “only game in
town.” It will lead to reinvigorated efforts to
re-regulate the railroads, because there is not
enough competition between railroads any
more. Any time an industry is federally
regulated, its vitality is diminished. Hence
short-lines will be hurt, because we are so
dependent on the Class I’s to provide the long
distance intercity movement.
Table 4 summarizes the Class I future trends as
predicted by the survey respondents.

SUMMARY
Short-line owner/managers were asked to
describe their business relationship with the
Class I railroads with which they interchange
traffic. The responses were positive; with almost
two-third's selecting the “good” or “very good”
choices. They were next queried regarding their
thoughts about how Class I railroad mergers
have affected their industry. Here the owner/
managers were less sanguine. More than half of
the respondents thought these mergers had a
detrimental impact on short-line railroads. When
asked why they took this position, the three most

TABLE 4

light traffic density trackage, and (3) A rail
industry renaissance.

MOST IMPORTANT CLASS I TRENDS
BESIDES MERGERS

CONCLUDING COMMENT

common rationales were: (1) Less competition for
short-line business, (2) Class I merger related
service breakdowns, and (3) Class I’s have
minimal interest in single car shipments.
However, about one-fifth of the respondents
thought that Class I mergers were beneficial to
them. The two reasons for this position were: (1)
Class I’s will offer only main-line service, and (2)
The accelerating trend to sell branch-line
trackage. The final question involved short-line
owner/managers perceptions of the most
important trends among Class I railroads, not
counting mergers. The three most common
responses were: (1) Increased utilization of
scheduled trains, (2) Continued Class I sale of

The railroad industry is composed of two
components—the short-lines and the Class I’s.
This survey, in our judgment, conclusively
illustrates the symbiotic relationship that exists
between the two parts. They need each other.
However, as this survey strongly indicates, only
one of the two parties clearly understands this.
Short-line owner/managers know that their
destiny is tied to the Class I’s. Unfortunately, it
appears that from the viewpoint of short-line
owner/managers, their importance to the Class
I’s is often not appreciated or even compre
hended. As we gaze into our “crystal ball,” here
is how we see the future. We believe Class I
carriers will continue to spin-off low traffic
density trackage to short-line railroads. The
Class I’s will also outsource more activities that
others can do more efficiently than they can.
This will be especially prevalent with labor
intensive functions, such as customer service
activities and the pick-up and delivery of rail
cars. The Class I’s will specialize in what they
do best—running scheduled trains on main-line
trackage between major cities. The short-lines
will feed cars between the shippers/consignees
and the Class I’s which provide the intercity
transportation. As this relationship matures,
both parties will desire to work together more
closely for their own mutual benefit. The result
will be a true “win-win-win” situation. Shippers/
consignees will receive better service at less cost,
while each of the rail partners becomes more
efficient and profitable. We believe the 21st
Century will experience a rail renaissance.
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